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Abstract 
The appeal of HE expansion has been particularly significant in the case of Portugal, whose levels of qualification of 
the labour force have been historically low. Over the last two decades the country has experience a massive expansion 
of its higher education system and the numbers of students enrolled and rates of enrolment have multiplied more than 
four times. This paper focus on the sustainability of this trend of higher education (HE) expansion in Portugal and 
attempts to update and rebalance a debate that is too often carried out exclusively from a supply-side perspective. The 
paper develops an empirical framework which incorporates the diversity of jobs currently carried out by university 
graduates and their changing skill requirements but that also provides a useful benchmark to refer to growing 
expectations mismatches among graduates. Using a new typology of graduate-level jobs and staff logs data collected 
annually by the Portuguese Government for private sector employees, the paper analyses the increasing dispersion of 
graduates’ relative earnings and relates this trend to the increasing diversification of their jobs. The paper also tests 
more directly the impact of over-education (relative to the graduate jobs’ current skill requirements) and finds that the 
relative penalty associated with this condition has increased during the 1995-2005 period.  The paper then questions the 
extent to which Portugal can continue to be portrayed as a straightforward success story regarding the massification of 
HE and considers the implications regarding political and social support for continuing expansion in the system.  
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1.  Introduction  
In recent years the expansion of higher education (HE) has become a staple of most political 
agendas. This has been presented as a strategy that is not only virtuous from an economic point of 
view, but also with clear social benefits regarding equality of opportunities and social mobility. The 
EU’s Lisbon Strategy has stressed the need to invest in the massive qualification of the workforce in 
order to improve Europe’s competitiveness position and to promote social inclusion. Moreover this 
policy agenda has had particular appeal in those countries such as Portugal where governments 
could present this expansion as a way of catching-up other countries’ levels of qualification and 
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productivity
1. The qualification level of the labour force has been historically low in Portugal, 
especially compared with its European counterparts. Hence, over the last two decades there has 
been a massive expansion of its higher education system, with both numbers of students enrolled 
and rates of enrolment by age cohort more than quadrupling since the mid-eighties and the share of 
young individuals currently participating in HE being now already very close to the current 
government’s target of 50%. Thus the Portuguese HE has moved from being a system directed to an 
elite of young individuals towards one directed to a very significant share of the country’s young 
population. It is in this sense that the term ‘mass higher education’ is used here (see Elias and 
Purcell 2004 for the case of the UK). However, it should be noted that the share of young people 
with a degree still remains relatively low, due to the expansion being recent and to a high drop-out 
rate among enrolled students.  
This paper provides a fresh look at the relative success of this agenda of mass higher education in 
Portugal by monitoring, in particular, how the value that employers attach to university-level 
degrees has changed since the mid-1990s. The relative value of a degree is measured here mainly in 
terms of the earnings premiums that employers are prepared to offer graduates over less qualified 
individuals. The results point to increasingly dispersed returns for the highly-skilled during this 
period, and this diversification is linked to the increasing diversification of jobs held by graduates 
and the associated rise in over-education. The argument is made that the concentrated HE 
massification in Portugal has been based predominantly on supply-side policies to the neglect of an 
understanding of the dynamics of change in both the job structure and graduates’ position within the 
job structure.  Limited evidence is found to support the notion, implicit in human capital theory, that 
all jobs can adjust to utilise available skills. These results call into question the sustainability of the 
current expansion without further change to the job structure due to the risk of increasing 
“expectations mismatches” among young university graduates and prospective students.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews recent empirical international evidence on 
rising wage inequality and over-education among graduates. Section 3 reviews the evolution of the 
Portuguese higher education system and previous studies about the relative benefits enjoyed by 
graduates over the last two decades. Section 4 describes the dataset used in our study and outlines 
our main empirical findings regarding the recent evolution of graduates´ relative earnings and the 
increasing dispersion of their wage premiums. In the attempt to make sense of these trends, section 
5 starts by considering degree characteristics and the nature of HE expansion as possible causes. 
Sections 6 to 8, in turn, rebalance the debate and consider instead the transformation of graduates’ 
job structure and the increasing incidence and impact of over-education. Section 9 concludes and 
discusses the implications of our findings.  
2.  Why return (once again) to the debate on over-education?   
The debate on the benefits or otherwise of the expansion of higher education has tended to go in 
cycles. The unreserved optimism of the 1960’s that education would at a stroke solve problems of 
both growth and inequality quickly gave way to alarmist predictions of massive waste of resources 
by creating an army of “over-educated” individuals
2.  However, the most pessimistic scenario never 
fully materialised:  the meta-studies that have attempted to cut through the huge diversity of results 
                                                            
1 In most European economies, this has become an integral part of a much wider political framework which now finds 
further strength in the Bologna Process of HE harmonisation across Europe. This political drive ultimately rests on the 
belief that HE expansion is a necessary pre-condition to unleash the much higher productive potential of new 
information and communication technologies and of the systemic changes associated with their implementation at work. 
Furthermore, a highly-qualified workforce is seen as capable to transform a society into a ‘magnet economy’ capable of 
attracting the resources of modern and high-skilled industries and multinationals (Brown and Lauder 2006) 
2 For the original contribution on this, see Freeman (1976).    3 
 
produced by this literature
3 do not find evidence that ‘over education’ has risen in considerable 
magnitude over the last three decades (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000; Rubb 2003; 
McGuinness 2006)
4. Furthermore, Schomburg and Teichler (Schomburg and Teichler 2006; 
Teichler 2007a; Teichler 2007b), based on an exhaustive study of the employment situation of 
European university graduates four years after graduation, did not find evidence of a significant 
deterioration in their relative situation vis-à-vis less qualified individuals at least up to the turn of 
the century. Most existing problems were argued to be transitional in nature with most graduates 
employed in sectors closely connected with their degrees, in jobs offering significant autonomy and 
where their degrees had relevance in meeting the skill requirements of their jobs. Only around 12% 
considered that their job did not correspond to their level of educational attainment with fewer still 
remaining in relatively low-level occupations (clerks, low-level sales jobs, manual jobs) and 
reporting actual mismatches between their skill levels and the jobs’ skill requirements
5. Moreover at 
least until recently, graduates wage premiums have generally remained considerably high. A recent 
OECD (2009) Education at a Glance report, for example, provides evidence that, up to 2007, 
tertiary type-A and post-graduates’ total monthly earnings were, in the large majority of European 
economies, at least 1,5 times higher than those who completed upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary education (see figure 1)
6.  
 
Figure 1. Total Monthly Earnings Premiums of University Graduates in 2007 
 
Source. Education at a Glance 2009: OECD indicators 
Notes. Includes Tertiary Type-A and B degrees;  upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education = 100 .   
                                                            
3 These studies have had to address major methodological difficulties in measuring over-education and tracking its 
progress overtime. According to Verhaest and Omey (2006), the large variability of estimates produced by the wide 
range of methods employed constitute the main weakness of this literature and the reason why it is viewed sceptically 
by a large number of mainstream academics. Green and Zhu (2010) single out the conceptual ambiguity and the lack of 
consistent time-series and longitudinal data as major problems.    
4  Most of these works assume, however, a universalistic view of over-education and do not explicitly attempt to 
compare the determinants of different levels of over-education across different countries or make separation between 
“genuine” or “apparent” over-education (see, for example, Chevalier 2003) 
5 The exception in this study appeared to be those with degrees in Humanities and Social Sciences. Schomburg (2007), 
in fact, argues that the field of study appears to have a decisive impact on European graduates’ objective conditions of 
work.  
6 The exceptions being Spain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark where graduates, in any case, still earned a significant 
premium over less qualified individuals. 
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Furthermore, in the majority of countries these relative premiums either increased since the turn of 
the century (as in Hungary, Germany or Italy) or remained fairly constant at high levels as in the 
case of Portugal but also the UK and the US, for example (see figure 2)
7. The returns were found to 
vary by age cohort- a point to which we return below- but younger tertiary graduates’ relative 
earnings also remained high in the great majority of European economies.  
 
Figure 2. Trends in relative earnings in the OECD:  25-64 (1997-2007) 
 
Source. Education at a Glance 2009: OECD indicators  
 
This evidence of sustained relatively high graduate wage premiums has contributed to a new 
consensus that as individual or private rates of return of investing in the completion of a degree 
have remained exceptionally high, that the returns of public investments in HE also remain high. 
However there are a number of trends in the data that might suggest that again this is too optimistic 
an interpretation. First of all, the 1980’s and early 1990’s generalised trend of simultaneous 
increases in the supply of university-educated workers and in their relative earnings, as documented 
for example by Peracchi et al. (2006), appears to have reached a plateau at the very least. Machin 
(2008), for example, confirms that the recent slow-down of graduates’ wage differentials is 
widespread and constitutes a new stylised fact for research on wage inequality
8. For the UK, Green 
and Zhu (2010) cite a number of recent studies to point out that graduates’ wage premiums appear 
to have started modestly declining since 2002. Crucially, this trend appears to be more pronounced 
for younger age cohorts and may have started earlier. Walker and Zhu (2008), for example, show 
that, despite stable average GWPs in the 1996 to 2003 period, these have fallen among younger 
graduate cohorts and particularly those that graduated after the massive expansion in the UK HE 
                                                            
7 The main exceptions to this pattern, in turn, are Norway and Spain where graduates have seen their relative earnings 
fall.  
8 The two other new stylized facts mentioned by the author are the increase in within-group (education, age and gender) 
inequality and the existence of divergent trends at the top and the bottom of wage distribution, a topic we fully cover 
below.  
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system. Chevalier, Harmon et al. (2004) also find evidence of significant decreases in the 
magnitude of younger cohorts’ earnings premiums already in the 1990’s. The possibility that older 
and more experienced graduates may be largely immune from the impact of shifts in supply 
therefore needs to be recognised in any analysis of the impact of HE expansion. Goldin and Katz 
(2007), argue that contrary to earlier periods (Katz and Murphy (1992), the  increase in US 
graduates relative earnings since the 1990’s has been more the product of a sluggish supply of 
university graduates rather than the continuation of sharp increases in demand. Autor, Katz et al. 
(2008) refer to this apparent slow-down in demand for graduate skills as ‘puzzling’ particularly with 
the internet revolution, for example, being a phenomenon of the 1990s.  
Once the analysis moves away from the average graduate in employment –and instead 
distinguishes by age cohorts and by occupational segments- a more differentiated picture emerges.  
As the share of graduates has increased, their employment landscape has become increasingly 
diversified with an ever increasing share of graduates being employed in associate- or middle-level 
occupations.  For the US, Lemieux (2008) has shown that while within-group inequality remained 
largely stable within other educational groups it rose considerably among HE graduates since the 
1990’s. These recent increases in wage inequality have been concentrated at the upper-part of wage 
distribution with much steeper relative gains for individuals above the 80
th percentile. Likewise 
Green and Zhu (2010) show that, in the UK, the returns to tertiary education grew slightly at the top 
end of graduates’ wage distribution in the 1994-2006 period while they fell considerably at the 
bottom. More importantly, the authors argue that stable relative earnings for the average or median 
graduate may be compatible with declining returns for those failing to secure higher-level jobs. 
This means that it is ever more necessary to have a differentiated analysis of the fortunes of 
graduates instead of a focus on that of the average or representative graduate. This approach should 
not lead back to the rather blind pessimism of the past but instead should allow for a differentiated 
analysis not only of types of graduates but also of the occupational segments in which they are 
employed. This differentiated analysis must allow for change within jobs as well as changes in the 
occupational structure. Thus, a large number of jobs, including intermediate-level occupations in 
particular, may over time have been transformed to the extent that they now require graduate-level 
skills. For example, Elias and Purcell (2004),  argue that in the UK occupational restructuring and 
the consequent development of new graduate-level managerial and technical specialisms has largely 
held the relative status of young university graduates constant and served to limit the extent of skills 
under-utilisation even at a time of strong expansion in HE supply
9. Thus, graduates may be able to 
substitute for less educated individuals and even be paid more for this work simply because these 
jobs may have indeed become more complex (Spitz-Oener 2006).  It is therefore vital not to ‘freeze 
in time’ the notion of what a graduate job is – or to associate it exclusively with either managerial 
or professional occupations – as such an approach will over-estimate the extent of  over-education.  
However not all of the integration of graduates is due to jobs becoming more complex; instead they 
may act as substitutes for less educated workers because they are seen, for example, as being more 
flexible and therefore still relatively cheap (Brown and Lauder 2006)  or because they have having 
better ‘generic’ skills (communication, sociability, self-management or basic computing 
skills)(Dickerson and Green 2004).  This process of integration is similar to that of the second half 
of the 20
th century where high-school educated workers, instead of graduates now, were forced to 
occupy lower-level positions as the result of the increasing massification of HE (Goldin and Katz 
2007). It is therefore important still to differentiate between types of jobs undertaken by graduates. 
Much of the intrinsic value of tertiary level education arises out of the opportunity to develop 
further skills at work which build on the further learning potential conferred by a degree and which 
                                                            
9 An alternative interpretation of course is that, as the massification of HE increases, the main and inevitable function of 
an increasing number of institutions may turn out to be precisely that of preparing students for these intermediate-level 
occupations with the adjustment being done through changes in the degrees´ curricula and organisation rather than 
through such changes in the demand for graduate skills.  6 
 
provide protection against substitution by cheaper workers. However not all jobs offer these 
opportunities or offer them only to a limited degree. Those unable to secure a job with such 
opportunities for skill development are also at greater risk of substitution by ‘cheaper’ workers and 
thereby more exposed to the compression of their relative wages. Walker and Zhu show for 
example that the earnings’ premiums of younger cohorts did not decrease if they secured a 
graduate-level job (meaning either a managerial or a professional job), while they fell for those 
failing to find such jobs.  
A significant share of tertiary educated individuals now either occupy intermediate-skilled 
positions – that require new but still relatively narrow skills profiles when compared with ‘true’ 
graduate or knowledge jobs - or dead-end jobs and their ability to transform these jobs may be 
limited. The job itself may then provide a significant cap to the relative benefits graduates can 
extract from obtaining a degree. A possible result is an increase in the share of those who Brown 
and Lauder (2006) call ‘knowledge workers without power’, who work in jobs in which cost 
considerations are significantly more important or for which they are over-qualified. They also earn, 
of course, much less than true knowledge workers with the result being a much higher level of 
inequality among graduates
10. 
Our research framework should therefore be sensitive to this tension within jobs between the 
transformation of skill demand promoted by the increasing availability of highly qualified 
individuals and the existence of limits to further skill accumulation. Equally useful could be to 
progress beyond the simplistic and static difference between graduate and non-graduate jobs and 
incorporate a richer framework capable of distinguishing between jobs where the upgrade in skill 
demand has been either significant or limited. This stands as a guiding principle of the research 
method used in this paper.  
This argument does not preclude the notion that the increasing diversity of graduates’ educational 
characteristics may also be playing a role in the increasing dispersion of graduates’ relative earnings.  
For the US, Lemieux (2006) argues that the continuing rise in the returns to post-graduate degrees 
explains a significant part of recent changes in inequality in the US.
11 There is indeed evidence that 
the earnings gap between postgraduates and undergraduates has increased more than between these 
latter group and high-school graduates (Goldin and Katz 2007) and that the returns to post-graduate 
degrees continued to rise rapidly and at similar rates relative to the 1980’s (Autor, Katz et al. 2008; 
Lemieux 2008). In turn, regarding the UK, O'Leary and Sloane (2005) show that there is a 
significant spread in the premiums over different fields of study and argue that the decrease in 
female graduates´ average earnings can be explained by their disproportionate concentration in 
particular subjects. These results are confirmed by a new study by Walker and Zhu (2010). 
Schomburg (2007) also argues that the field of study is an important determinant of  young 
graduates’ relative fortunes across Europe. Within our framework educational characteristics may 
not have a direct effect on wage inequality but an indirect effect through the job assignment process. 
Clearly, however, this perspective is an alternative to the idea that the increasing dispersion of 
graduates’ earnings follows simply from the also increasing dispersion of unobserved ability among 
tertiary students. It is worth noting here that the increasing dispersion is mostly felt at the top of 
graduates’ wage distribution (Atkinson 2007; Machin 2008; Green and Zhu 2010) whereas it could 
be expected to be found more at the lower end if the main factor was the widening dispersion of 
abilities with the increase in shares of the cohort entering higher education.  
 
 
                                                            
10  Brown and Lauder argue, in addition, that a number of these jobs can be increasingly off-shored, further 
undermining, therefore, the relative position of such graduate segments.   
11  For the case of the UK instead, Mcintosh (2006) shows that additional returns to ‘higher degrees’ have also increased 
very slightly from 1996 to 2002. O’Leary and Sloane (2005) also show that the returns to a post-graduate degree 
(particularly a PhD) were significantly higher than that of a degree. 7 
 
3.  Previous evidence: is mass higher education in Portugal a success story? 
The issue of educational qualifications has been a theme of significant political and academic 
interest in Portugal for a long time. This has been particularly stimulated by the fact that the country 
has historically presented some of the lowest levels of qualifications when compared to most 
European countries. Hence, this created an embedded belief that this lag in educational achievement 
explained an important part of the country’s economic backwardness and that individual and social 
economic advancement would be significantly boosted by a serious progress in educational 
qualifications. For instance, only by the mid-twentieth century did the majority of the adult 
population attained basic literacy levels and by the end of the last century almost 10% of the 
population was still illiterate. These results did not compare favourably even with the other southern 
European countries that have also lagged vis-à-vis a much earlier literate Northern and Central 
Europe. The inheritance of this slow development in educational qualifications endured in the 
working population, since nowadays around two-thirds of the working population has either basic 
educational levels or less. Thus, the massive expansion that took place over the last decades in the 
educational system has introduced a major break in the previous patterns and enlarged access 
significantly. 
 
Table 1. Educational Qualifications of Portuguese Labour Force (%) 
 1981  1991  2008 
Illiterate 26,4  15,3  4,2 
Basic literacy  1,1  0,8  -- 
1st Cycle Basic  47,6  43,8  28,2 
2nd Cycle Basic  9,0  12,7  20,4 
3rd Cycle Basic  8,3b  10,9a  21,4 
Secondary 4,9b  8,7a  14,7 
Tertiary 2,8b  6,3a  11,0 
a – enrolment and graduation; b – completed;  
Source. Barreto (1996) e INE (2008) 
 
 
The changes were particularly significant at the higher education level. Until the mid-eighties, the 
Portuguese higher education sector remained very small and elitist (Teixeira, Rosa et al. 2006). 
Until the beginning of the 1970s there were only 4 Universities (all of them public), but during that 
decade a process of expansion was initiated with the purpose of widening access to higher 
education. After the Democratic Revolution of 1974 several other public universities and 
polytechnic institutes were created with the aim to expand and diversify the higher education 
system. The polytechnic subsystem was intended to have a strong applied and technical emphasis 
and marked vocational orientation adapted to regional needs. By the eighties the social and political 
pressures for expansion became very strong and the system has expanded massively since then, 8 
 
both in number of institutions and in students enrolled. The late 1980s saw the rise of private higher 
education which benefited from the difficulty of the public sector to absorb a rapidly growing 
demand (and also from facilitating policies of the Minister of Education at that time (1987-91) who 
not only approved a large number of new private institutions but also decided to lower the access 
requirements to higher education which created favourable market conditions for the private sector). 
Thus, during the last decades of the twentieth century the Portuguese higher education system 
multiplied its size several times. 
 
Table 2. Growth of enrolments, total and by sub-sector 
 1971  1981  1991  2001  2008 
No. % No. % No.  %  No  % No. % 
Public Universities 43,191  87,3  64,659 76,8 103,999 47,0  176.303 44,5 169.449 43,6
Public Polytechnics 2,981  6,0  12,195 14,5 31,351 28,7  108.486 27,3 105.872 27,9
Private institutions 3,289  6,7  7,319 8,7  51,430 24,3  111.812 28,2  91.408  28,5
Total 49,461  100,0  84,173 100,0186,780 100,0  396.601 100,0366.729100,0
  Source. Barreto (1996); Simão et al (2002); OCES 
 
In recent years the demand has stabilized due to demographic changes. At present, the Portuguese 
public higher education system comprises 13 public universities, an Open University (Universidade 
Aberta) and a university institute (ISCTE), 15 public polytechnics and 32 polytechnic schools. In 
the private sector there are 7 universities (including a Catholic University), 4 polytechnic institutes 
and 72 schools of university and polytechnic education. As table 2 indicates, there were profound 
transformations of the system over the last decades. The system approximately doubled its size each 
decade, moving steadily away from its original elitist character. If until the early 1980s, public 
universities overwhelmingly dominated the higher education system, a decade later the non-
university public sector was already absorbing a significant proportion of enrolments and, 
nowadays, the vocational public sector enrols more than a quarter of the total system. On the other 
hand, the expansion was also significantly fuelled by the private sector, representing about 1/3 of 
enrolments, though this sector has declined over the last decade. Portugal has nowadays a rate of 
gross enrolment similar to its European counterparts and a very diverse sector.  
This massive expansion of the higher education system has been supported by very high 
expectations regarding the private (and public benefits) associated with a higher education degree. 
During most of the 1980s and 1990s the reality seems to have lived up to the expectations, and in 
some cases even surpassed it. Despite the massive expansion of the higher education system, the 
private return to education has been persistently reported as very profitable at around 10%. A 
synthesis of various studies covering the last 20 years (see table 3) indicates that these results are 
robust and that the average return was not significantly affected. The private returns to education 
have grown in the late eighties and early nineties, which helps to explain the buoyant demand, 
especially for higher education, at that time. These results tend to be explained by the expansion in 
the demand for more skilled labour due to the very good performance of the country during that 
period, following the country entry in the EU in 1986. This brought not only a large inflow of EU 
structural funds, but also stimulated a major growth in FDI during the following 10-15 years.   
 9 
 
Table 3. Private Rates of Return to Education in Portugal 
STUDY PERIOD  ESTIMATION 
METHOD 
RATES OF RETURN 
Kiker and 
Santos (1991) 
1985 OLS  9.4-10.4% 
(Vieira 1999)  1986/1992  OLS e IV  7.5-8.2% (OLS) 
Martins and 
Pereira (2004) 
1995  OLS e Quantile R  OLS - 12.6% 
QR - 6.7-15.6% 
(Machado and 
Mata 2001) 
1982/1994  OLS e Quantile R  OLS - 1.3-9.2%  / 0.4-11.3 
QR - 0.5-10.1% / 0.3-13.8% 
(Hartog, Pereira 
et al. 2001) 
1982/1986/1992  OLS e Quantile R  OLS - 5.3% / 5.5% / 6.4% 
QR - 3.1-6.6% / 3.4-7.0% / 3.6-8.0% 
 
The high expectations regarding education were also clearly associated with advantages regarding 
employability. The low levels of the qualifications of the Portuguese labour force and its 
particularly small share of university graduates have historically granted significant economic and 
social benefits to the latter. Like in many elite higher education systems, having a university degree 
was associated with stable and well-paid employment in relative terms. This also fuelled strong 
social demand for an expanding higher education system. However, the public opinion regarded 
with concern the pace of expansion of the system, especially from the 1980s onwards. Many 
expressed the view that this would soon create a significant problem of graduate unemployment. 
This was based on the widely held assumption among many non-economists that the number of jobs 
for university graduates is limited over time and that an expansion will create an increase in 
graduate unemployment. Additionally, many expressed concerns about rising over-education 
(though not always phrased in that way) and of a subsequent repositioning across the labour force, 
with new graduates replacing workers with lower occupations in jobs not traditionally occupied by 
the former. 
The evolution of the unemployment rate by levels of qualification indicates that until the beginning 
of the twentieth-first century these fears were largely exaggerated. The unemployment rate among 
university graduates increased from around 1% in 1981 to 4% in 1991, though remained around that 
level throughout most of the 1990s. Thus, although there was an increase, unemployment among 
university graduates remained very low and its evolution did not mirror the expansion of the higher 
education system. In fact, after an initial period in which the demand for skilled labour struggled to 
keep pace with a massive outpouring of graduates, the evolution in the nineties suggested that 
although the number of graduates continued to rise at a fast pace, the rate of unemployment among 
graduates stabilized. Moreover, other studies have indicated that a lot of this unemployment was 
due to frictional issues in the labour market.
12 Hence, even those graduates that were affected by 
unemployment were likely to find a new job faster than other workers with lower qualifications. 
                                                            
12 Underneath this rate of unemployment for graduates seems to be the coexistence of high rates of job creation and job 
destruction and, therefore, a high job turnover among university graduates (Cardoso e Ferreira, 2002). 10 
 
Regarding the fears of rising over-education, during the period 1986-1999 the evidence has also 
contradicted the pessimistic expectations. Contrary to the expectation that the employability of 
graduates was based on the occupation on non-graduate jobs, since Portugal joined the EU in 1986, 
graduates have moved to better paid jobs and that the probability of occupying jobs normally taken 
by individuals with lower qualifications has declined
13 (Cardoso 2007). This adjustment was also 
caused by an upskilling of certain occupations who started to require higher qualifications and to 
provide higher salaries. The analysis of the incidence of over and under education for the 1980s and 
1990s also seems to confirm this picture. Despite the apparent rigidity of the Portuguese labour 
market, which was likely to increase the magnitude of those two phenomenon, by hindering the 
capacity of firms to adjust their workforce to its changing needs, the evidence available for the 
1990s indicated that the large majority of workers presented qualifications close to the average of 
workers employed on those occupations (Kiker, Santos et al. 1997). There was also a decline in the 
incidence of under-education and a slight increase in over-education, which is consistent with the 
fast and massive improvement in the qualifications of the labour force. Moreover, subsequent work 
argued that many of these unbalances are frequently of a short-term nature (Oliveira, Santos et al. 
2000). An important share of cases of over-education correspond to an entry strategy by many 
younger workers of compensating their lack of experience with higher than average qualifications, 
and an important share of under-education corresponds to older workers that tend to compensate 
their lower formal qualifications with greater on-the-job experience. Thus, it is not unlikely that 
those younger workers may be able to move to better jobs once they suppress their experience 
handicap. The existence of both unbalances cannot be dissociated either from the major structural 
adjustments faced by the Portuguese economy over the last 25 years, after joining the EU. 
However, this kind of success story has started to become more complicated in recent years. One of 
the signs that the situation could be less straightforward was shown by the fact that several recent 
studies indicated that, underneath the high average private return to education, there was a large 
variability in those returns. The magnitude of this variation was not uniform across studies, though 
they tended to indicate that it had increased, at least slightly, from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
Accordingly, the private return to an additional year of education was reported from as high as 15% 
to below 1%. The increase in variability seems to have been more influenced by an increase in the 
upper bound, than to a decline in the lower bound, which is consistent with the aforementioned 
slight increase in the average return. This variability is even more significant when we compare the 
results obtained for Portugal with other European countries. In a study published a few years ago, 
Martins and Pereira (2004) compared the return to an additional year of education for Portugal with 
an average of 17 European countries (EU-15 plus Norway and Switzerland), whose main results are 
reported in table 3. Their results confirm that Portugal had one of the highest returns to education, 
but also one of the most variable. 
The rising dispersion in the private return to education is very significant as well because Portugal 
has one of the most unequal countries within the EU regarding the distribution of earnings. In fact, 
the evidence available indicates that although inequality may have decreased in the 1980s, it has 
clearly increased over the 1990s, especially during the first half of the decade, having stabilized 
afterwards for lower levels of income but increased for higher incomes (Rodrigues 2007). Whereas 
there was no long run trend in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution during the period 1980-
2000, in the upper part of the distribution there was a clear trend of what has been called the 
fanning-out of the earnings distribution (Atkinson 2008). All the top measures (upper quartile, 
upper decile and upper decile) have increase relatively to the median income and, even more 
significantly, the increases where greater the higher the measure we were considering. 
This evolution in earnings, combined with the previous data about dispersion of returns to education, 
suggests that the rising inequality is mostly associated with a growing dispersion in higher incomes 
                                                            
13 Cardoso, however, considers non-graduate jobs only as those that fail to pay premiums above 10%, a point to which 
we return below.   11 
 
and workers with higher levels of schooling. The data indicate that the earnings’ advantage of more 
educated workers has resisted and was even strengthened over the 1990s. This is even more 
significant since this was the period of fastest expansion in higher education’s enrolments. Several 
studies have indicated that the level of education has been the major explanatory variable regarding 
levels of inequality and poverty for the period 1989-2000 and that this greater inequality was 
enhanced by the growing inequality in return to education (Hartog, Pereira et al. 2001). This is not 
surprising in periods of expansion of education, because the benefits of more education tend to 
enlarge the possibilities and incomes of those that manage to reach the higher levels of education.  
 
Table 4. Earnings by highest level of Education attained in Portugal (1989-2000) 
LEVEL OF 
SCHOOLING 
AVERAGE EARNINGS  DEVIATION VIS-A-VIS AVERAGE 
EARNINGS 
1989 1995 2000  1989  1995  2000 
None completed  4.169  4.324  4.933  62,1  55,0  55,2 
Basic Education  6.561  6.988  7.939  97,8  88,9  88,8 
Secondary  Education 10.462 11.782 12.182  155,9  149,9  136,3 
Tertiary  Education  14.202 18.754 21.340  211,7  238,6  238,8 
Total 6.709  7.860  8.937  100,0  100,0  100,0 
           Source. Rodrigues (2007) 
 
The analysis of evolution of wage’s dispersion also indicates a trend of steep increase in the degree 
of dispersion for the period 1985-2005 (see Cardoso, 2009). This evolution is nevertheless 
composed of two contrasting trends. On the one hand, there is a reduction of wage inequality when 
comparing the median wage and the lowest deciles. On the other hand, there is a growing inequality 
when comparing the median wage with the highest deciles. This evolution of wage inequality 
reflects to a large extent the evolution of the wage premium for university graduates over this period. 
Three possible explanations have normally been advanced for changes in wages’ structures: 
technological progress and the bias towards more skilled workers, which could have led to greater 
differentiation (or even segmentation) in the labour market; Increasing competition in international 
markets and greater economic interdependence associated with growing economic globalization, 
creating a large pressure on less skilled workers, especially in those sectors facing greater 
international competition; and decline in unionization and de-regulation of the labour market, which 
has diminished the protection to certain groups of workers. Preliminary results indicate that the first 
hypothesis seems to be the strongest explanatory factor, especially since there are indications of 
increasing wage inequality between firms within industry. Nonetheless, they also underline a 
pattern of change and increasing inequality that may be extremely relevant for the analysis of 
transition of higher education graduates to the labour market. 
Overall, recent studies have produced a more nuanced view about the so-called success story and 
pointed out latent problems in the articulation between the educational system and labour market, 
especially at the higher level. This is very important to follow since in recent years public 
perceptions about the private benefits of a higher education have shown a declining confidence in 12 
 
the economic value of a degree. These concerns have become even more significant over the last 
decade, and especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic crisis. The Portuguese 
economy has had a mediocre performance since 2001, which has reflected in a growing difficulty to 
create jobs and a rapidly growing unemployment rate. The current situation has affected a rising 
share of graduates, suggesting that their once rather protected position is being eroded. It is also 
important to assess the recent evolution of the average return and the dispersion among those 
returns and to what extent there is a growing inequality among the fate of higher education 
graduates.  
Table 5. Rate of Unemployment by Level of Education (2003-2010) 
Level of 
qualification 
Basic or less  Secondary  Higher 
Education 
Total 
2003  6.2 6.9 6.0 6.3 
2005  7.8 8.0 6.3 7.6 
2007  8.0 6.2 7.5 8.0 
2009  10.1  9.6 6.4 9.5 
2010    11.6  11.3 7.1 10.8 
        Source. INE – National Statistics Office 
4.  Data and Recent Trends  
This paper uses the Portuguese Government’s Quadros de Pessoal (QP) dataset to monitor the 
evolution of young graduates’ relative earnings in recent years (1995 to 2005). This is an 
exceptionally comprehensive and high-quality dataset which aggregates staff logs collected 
annually and compulsorily by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security (MTSS) 
with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of employment legislation. The dataset covers 
practically the whole universe of business firms with at least one wage-earning employees 
excluding, however, the public administration and domestic services sectors
14. Employers (self-
employed with wage-earning employees) as well as non-wage earning family workers were 
excluded
15.Calculations, unless otherwise noted,  refer to normal hourly earnings which include 
regular or basic monthly wage, seniority-indexed components of pay and other regular pay 
components
16. Additionally, following Cardoso (2007), we excluded individuals with hourly 
earnings higher than 10 times that of the 99th percentile in each year and those with hourly earnings 
below the adjusted minimum wage
17.  
                                                            
14 We also exclude the agricultural, fishing and mining sectors (Code A, NACE Rev 1.1) due to the lack of wage 
earners in these sectors. The residuals cases of domestic services employees and those working in extra-territorial 
bodies were also deleted (sectors 95 and 99, Nace Rev 1.1).. 
15 Individuals without information regarding their occupational category (ISCO-88 3-digit) or their highest level of 
education were also excluded. The same happened with individuals without a working schedule (a status which is 
controlled by a specific variable in the dataset) or with missing wage data.   
16  We exclude overtime hours as to focus on permanent changes both in the composition of employment and 
individuals’ wages and avoid measuring specific shifts associated with the reference week in which the data is 
collected. Results are however broadly similar if one considers overtime.  
17 Finally, each individual in the dataset may have more than one data entry provided that he or she works in more than 
one firm (e.g.: an accountant working short hours in a number of firms). These cases are a minority in the dataset with 
regularly more than 92% of all available cases in each year corresponding to individuals with one job. We keep these 13 
 
Our calculations usually refer to individuals aged between 26 and 36 unless otherwise noted. We 
take into account the fact that, as noted earlier, the massification of the Portuguese HE system has 
only started recently and that, therefore, older graduates may be ‘protected’ from HE expansion due 
to ‘first-mover’ advantages and higher on-the-job experience.
18 If the average young graduate is still 
certainly young, the inclusion of older university graduates in our calculations has the potential of 
blurring the relative situation of those who have just recently completed a degree. Furthermore, the 
focus on the 26 to 36 age segment aims to move the analysis beyond graduates’ transition into their 
first job and to control for atypical employment episodes during the completion of their degrees
19.  
Regarding the actual monitoring of trends, and similarly to Cardoso (2007) we first calculate 
graduates’ wage premiums (GWP) as the estimated coefficient ρ in the following OLS framework:  
  
                                                                                         2        t 
(4.1.)  ln |W(u, x, C)|  =  α0 +  ρ u + β0 x + β1 x   + ∑ βj C + ε , 
                                                                                                 j=2 
 
, where W (u, x, C) measures regular hourly earnings, u is a dummy on the completion of either 
upper secondary or tertiary education, x refers to potential work experience (age – schooling years – 
6) and C is a vector of further controls for individual or job characteristics with a separable effect on 
wages, namely part-time status. C includes, however, a very narrow set of control variables since 
we assume that the effect of other possible determinants of earnings is not fully separable from that 
of education. There is indeed a risk of emptying out the overall premium attributed to the 
completion of a tertiary degree by fitting an over-complex set of control variables
20. 
Following Peracchi, Hanushek et al. (2006), we argue that this GWP concept differs from Mincer’s 
(1974) internal rate of return (IRR) to education since it does not necessarily refer to the causal, 
stationary and fully separable and predictable effect of university education on individuals’ earnings. 
GWP is used here instead as a descriptive measure of graduates’ relative benefits over otherwise 
similar and experienced individuals and can be seen as the average price attributed to tertiary 
education at a particular point in time. 
To our knowledge, no studies have yet updated Cardoso´s (2007) calculations for the 1986-1999 
period. In order to enhance comparability, we initially considered only either high-school or 
university graduates with up to ten years of potential experience but then performed separate 
calculations by gender and age-groups. 
The resulting message (see figure 3) is that the downward trend apparently initiated in 1995 
(according to Cardoso calculations) has continued in more recent years and that it has been 
especially pronounced in the case of men. In 1995, young male university graduates’ hourly wages 
were, on average and holding other predictors constant, almost 73% higher than those earned by 
high-school graduates. By 2005, however that premium had decreased by around 11 percentage 
points. Among women, this decrease was substantially lower (4 percentage points from a premium 
slightly above 65% in 1995). If the relative earnings premium of both male and female graduates 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
cases, however, because our interest is on the job’s relative quality and we do not wish to exclude workers in multi-
employer arrangements. In any case, the number of available cases in each year should not then be taken as indicative 
of the number of cases in the whole universe of private-sector wage-earning employees.  
18  We do in fact show later in the paper that GPWs trends are significantly different across different age cohorts. 
19 According to recent OECD (2007) data, the typical graduation age in Portugal – prior to the reorganisation of degrees 
promoted by the Bologna process – was around 21 for tertiary type-B degrees and between 22 and 26 for type-A 
degrees. 
20 We assume that the effect of other possible determinants of earnings is not fully separable from that of education. If 
the completion of a degree allows university graduates to access better quality jobs, for example, and that further 
learning opportunities within these jobs impact graduates’ future productivity, what remains as the independent effect of 
university education can be considerably abstract. By including sector or occupation dummies, for example, we would 
only capture their independent and average effect for both high-school and university graduates.  14 
 
had then converged as a result of these trends, it is also the case that these continue to be high by 
European standards.   
 
Figure 3. Young University Graduates’ Wage Premium in Portugal, 1995 - 2005 (individuals with 
up to ten years of potential experience) 
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Following the method used by Cardoso (2007), wage premiums are measured by the value of the coefficient of a university 
dummy on a log-hourly earnings regression framework which also includes controls for “potential experience” (quadratic) and part-
time employment status. “Potential experience” is defined by deducting the number of schooling years plus 6 (the age at which pupils 
enter primary education) from the age of each individual. Only individuals with up to ten years of potential experience are considered 
here and hourly earnings refer to “regular” earnings (i.e.: excluding overtime). Calculations using total hourly earnings provide very 
similar results. No data are available for 2001. The 2001 entry is calculated by simply considering the average of the 2000 and 2002 
values.  
 
Figure 4. University Graduates’ Wage Premium by Age Cohorts, 1995 – 2005 
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Calculations are done separately for these two age cohorts instead.  
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The calculations for the two separate age cohorts (figure 4) show however that the decrease in GWP 
among the young is somewhat less pronounced, even if it is visible that young graduates’ wage 
premiums peaked around 1997 and have decreased since then, especially again in the case of men. 
Since these calculations consider slightly older graduates than previously
21, a significant part of the 
reported decrease in GWPs may be due to increasing difficulties in graduates’ transition into 
employment. Our results do confirm, however, that older graduate cohorts appear to have been 
largely immune from the impact of HE expansion with their average premiums still increasing 
throughout most of the period and at least up to 2003. This may suggest either that older and 
younger graduates may be imperfect substitutes or indeed that younger graduates may have been 
substituting older and less qualified workers in intermediate-skilled jobs, a hypothesis which we do 
not fully pursue here.  
There is however one important methodological critique to these calculations that follows from the 
arguments raised in the previous two sections. Instead of focusing on the average graduate worker, 
we ought to pay particular attention to the dispersion of HE wage premiums across the wage 
distribution since there is increasing evidence that the impact of HE massification may have not 
been uniform among graduates. In addition to OLS estimates, we then use a quantile regression (QR) 
framework (Koenker and Bassett 1978; Buchinsky 1994) to test for the possibility of increasing 
heterogeneity among graduates’ wage premiums (GWP)
22: 
 
                                                                                                   2         t 
(4.2)  ln |Wp (u, x, C)|  =  α0p +  ρp u + β0p x + β1p x   + ∑ βjp C + ε p , 
                                                                                                         j=2 
 
, where, in addition to the subscripts indentified above, p corresponds to the pth percentile of the  
distribution of university and high school graduates´ earnings.   
An important part of the argument that demand for higher education skills grew at an extraordinary 
pace in Portugal up to the mid-1990’s was the idea that rising GWPs applied across the whole 
spectrum of jobs held by graduates (see again, for example, Cardoso 2007). Figure 5 presents 
conditional wage premiums for the 90
th,75
th ,50
th, 25
th and 10
th percentiles from 1995 to 2005 and 
shows that the shape of the distribution of graduates’ relative premiums became more complex 
during this more recent period. The graph presents two types of information. First, and regarding 
each year’s spread of GWPS, the graph confirms that the lowest paid graduates are significantly 
penalized in Portugal as there is a considerable dispersion of returns particularly below the median. 
Second, it also demonstrates that the least successful graduates witnessed their relative situation 
deteriorating considerably across this period, once again particularly in the case of men for whom 
returns were much less dispersed at the beginning of the period
23. This decrease in the relative value 
of a degree has also been felt exclusively below the median.  
 
 
                                                            
21 “Individuals with up to ten years of potential experience” refers to individuals aged up to 32 years old in the case of 
those who have completed tertiary education and aged up to 28 years old in the case of those who have completed 
secondary education. Because high-school graduates enter the labour market much sooner than university graduates, we 
compared two very different  age groups in the calculations made above.  
22 While OLS estimates the earnings premium at the mean of the distribution, QR estimates it for individuals located at 
different quantiles of the wage distribution and does so by re-weighting all the available data. Estimate for the 10% 
decile, for example, assigns half the weight of errors to cases within the lowest 10% of wages and half the weight to the 
other 90%. The method then requires a sufficient number of highly and low educated individuals both at the top and 
bottom of the distribution. This is unlikely to be a limitation here since we only consider individuals with at least upper 
secondary education and since we use a very large and highly representative dataset. 
23 In 1995 and in the case of men, there were no statistical significant differences for GWPs above the median (50
th, 75
th 
and 90
th percentiles) despite the very high number of cases included in the QP dataset and the very low standard errors 
and narrow confidence intervals involved in these calculations.  16 
 
Figure 5. Young Graduates Wage Premiums: Conditional Quantile Regression Estimates, 1995-
2005 
             a) Men                                                                        b) Women 
 
Source. QP Dataset (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Only individuals aged between 26 and 36 years of age are considered.  
 
Relative premiums at the upper quantiles, on the other hand, remained high. Thus, in 2005, while 
male graduates at the top of the wage distribution were paid close to 76% more per hour than 
otherwise similar but less qualified individuals, the corresponding figure at the bottom of the wage 
distribution was 41%. Relative trends among women, however, were more stable even if GWPs 
decreased also for young graduate women at the bottom of the wage distribution (10
th percentile). 
Again, there is some degree of convergence here since differences were already higher for women 
in the beginning of the period. It is possible that this is linked with the earlier and more significant 
expansion of tertiary education among women but it can also be made compatible with a much 
sharper impact of occupational restructuring among men,  a point to which we return below. Finally,  
the hourly wage increase associated with one additional year of work experience (for both levels of 
education considered) also rises considerably as one progresses towards the top of the wage 
hierarchy and, presumably, towards better jobs. This suggests that differences in the overall benefits 
of a degree over time can be even larger for the most successful graduates considering that jobs at 
the top should be disproportionally filled by young university graduates.  
From a policy point of view it is crucial to understand why the least successful graduates saw their 
relative position deteriorating.  As the HE system expands and involves new segments of the young 
population (from less affluent socio-economic backgrounds and that enrol in new types of degrees 
or institutions) their fate should be of particular concern to politicians because there is the potential 
of rising expectation mismatches and therefore a greater threat to further HE expansion.  
5.  Starting Making Sense of Growing Inequality among Graduates: Unregulated HE 
Expansion   
Most mainstream studies interpret different GWPs across the wage distribution as indicative of 
different complementarities between tertiary education and innate ability. The fact that, as 
documented earlier, Portuguese graduates improved their relative position during the early periods 
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of HE expansion has also traditionally been interpreted as supporting the idea (implicit in human 
capital theory) that all jobs can be transformed to reflect individuals innate or acquired level of 
skills.  
In this sense, the dispersion of GWPs could simply reflect the wider range of innate ability levels of 
the young individuals who now reach HE or, alternatively, differences in educational characteristics, 
namely the adequacy of curriculums to labour market needs or the overall quality of degrees and 
institutions.  
Regarding degree characteristics, the QP dataset has information only about the degrees’ field of 
studies (ISCED-97 classification) as well as its type and length (bacharelato vs. licenciatura). 
Regarding the latter, Figure 6 presents GWPs calculated using separate dummies for these two 
different types of degree in a regression framework similar to (4.1)
24. The much sharper decrease in 
the relative value of Licenciatura degrees which is visible in the graph mirrors the strong increase in 
the supply of graduates with this type of degrees. There has been, in fact, a strong shift in the 
relative importance of this type of degrees over this period with the share of Bacharelato holders 
falling to around 23% in 2005 compared with 31% in 1995 according to QP data. Their relative 
earnings have, however, decreased much more slowly in the case of men and have even increased 
significantly for  women. Female Licenciatura holders, in turn, experienced a  decrease comparable 
to men. We have then witnessed  a clear convergence between the price attributed to academic and 
more vocational-oriented degrees at least up to 2002. In any case, GWPs for the academically-
oriented degrees remained, however, much higher, which can still justify students’ continuing 
preference for this type of degrees. The potential for the build-up of expectations mismatches is 
again, however, considerable here since the decrease in the value of these degrees has been much 
sharper than the trend documented above. 
 
Figure 6. Young University Graduates’ Wage Premium in Portugal by Type of Degree, 1995 – 2005 
 
Source: QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes:  Calculations are done using a similar framework. The university education dummy in this model is, however, split into two further dummies 
depending on the type of degree obtained by each individual. Only individuals with up to ten years of experience are considered here.  
 
                                                            
24 Only individuals with up to ten years of experience are considered here. 
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Figure 7 also shows quantile regression estimates for both these types of degrees in three specific 
years (1995, 2000 and 2005). The slash in the GWPs of Licenciatura holders applied mainly to 
those below the median. There were, however, finer dynamics at play. The most successful male 
graduates largely kept their relative position unchanged and Bacharelato holders actually 
experienced significant increases of GWPS. Women with a Bacharelato degree, however, saw the 
prices attributed to their degrees actually increasing significantly in all quantiles except at the very 
bottom of the wage distribution. By 2005, the most successful Bacharelato holders were thus 
actually able to extract higher relative premiums based on their education than were the least 
successful holders of Licenciatura degrees in their respective jobs with the point being that the 
financial motivation that may have lead many students to embark in longer and more academically 
oriented degrees has been heavily slashed for the lowest paid. Inequality among graduates has 
therefore increased significantly. This runs against the evidence of wage compression presented by 
Budria and Pereira (2005) for the 1993 to 2000 period. That trend was puzzling in a context of HE 
expansion since it was incompatible with an increase in over-education. That is no longer the case 
here however. The authors’ disregard for cohort differences may however explain this apparent 
contradiction.   
 
Figure 7. Young Graduates Wage Premiums by Type of Degree: Quantile Regressions, 1995, 2000 and 2005 
a )   M e n          b )   W o m e n  
 
Source. QP Dataset (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Only individuals aged between 26 and 36 years of age are considered.   
 
The consensus that demand for graduate-level skills was growing at an extraordinary pace during 
earlier periods of HE expansion helped mute voices warning that the unregulated growth of the HE 
system could lead to rising over-education. The evidence presented above, however, calls for 
further caution. On the one hand, the increasing supply of academic-oriented degrees dissociated of 
labour market needs may partly explain the trends described above. On the other hand, it is 
somewhat simplistic to associate it with the increasing dispersion of innate ability levels or, for 
example, graduates’ socio-economic origins if we take into account that the premiums of vocational 
oriented degrees offered by polytechnic institutions – which traditionally granted HE access to the 
least privileged parts of society – stabilised or even increased. The unregulated and excessive 
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
1995 Licenc 1995 Bach 
2000 Licenc 2000 Bach
2005 Licenc  2005 Bach 
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
1995 Licenc 1995 Bach 
2000 Licenc 2000 Bach
2005 Licenc  2005 Bach 19 
 
growth of HE courses with little relevance to employers is also a recurrent explanation of 
difficulties in the transition to the labour market and of rising wage inequality among graduates. 
Figure 8 shows GWPs by field of education for both 2000 and 2005
25. It is the case that degrees in 
computing, sciences or health-related subjects still granted in 2005 higher premiums than other 
subjects. This gives ground to the idea that the growth of vacancies in particular areas may explain 
part of the decreasing value attributed to HE over this period. The clear distinction in GWPs by 
fields of study has however faded since 2000.  
 
Figure 8. University Graduates’ Wage Premiums by Field of Education, 2000 vs. 2005 
a) Men     
 
b) Women 
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Calculations are done using a framework similar to equation (A.4) – see Appendix A. The university education 
dummy is split into a number of dummies depending on the field of education in which the degree is obtained. Only 
individuals with up to ten years of experience are considered here.  
                                                            
25 Since the QP classification scheme of tertiary degrees has changed in 2000, earlier series are not directly comparable 
with these later results. GWPs are calculated using separate dummies for different fields of study in a regression 
framework similar to (4.1).  20 
 
Male graduates in areas such as computing, engineering, manufacturing and construction and 
sciences, in particular, experienced a net relative decrease in their premiums compared to other 
fields of education. The fact that most degrees were not immune to decreasing earnings’ premiums 
should warn us against simply attributing the shits in the overall trend of rising GWPS to the re-
composition of HE supply.  
 
6. Rebalancing the Debate: Job Structure Effects  
Since GWPs kept increasing during earlier periods of HE expansion, academic studies have rarely 
looked at job structure effects and assumed that the Portuguese productive structure showed 
sufficient dynamism to absorb new graduate generations.  We now argue that in order to make 
sense of the increasing heterogeneity of HE premiums we should look at the wider array of jobs that 
graduates now perform and their relative success in job assignment processes. Lower GWPs for the 
least successful graduates may in this sense be explained by a lack of enough graduate-level jobs 
(Budría and Pereira 2005).  
Even if Portuguese graduates are now facing access to an increasingly segmented labour market we 
should also keep in mind that jobs that traditionally were non-graduate jobs may have been 
restructured and may now require graduate-level qualifications. We should then take into account 
this tension between changes in the structure of employment and occupational restructuring in ways 
that the traditional definitions of graduate jobs of the widely available ISCO-88 occupational 
classification (ILO 1990) cannot. Inspired by the work of Elias and Purcell (2004), we distinguish 
between graduate-jobs, new graduate jobs and non-graduate jobs by considering intergenerational 
shifts in skill intensity. All detailed 3-digit ISCO occupations were, therefore, initially grouped 
according to the procedures described in table 6
26:  
 
Table 6. Skill Intensity Thresholds used in the Construction of the GRADJOBS Typology 
Occupational 
Group 
Older Age 
Group 
45-54 
Younger Age Group 
26 – 36 
Graduate Jobs  >=50% of 
Highly 
Skilled 
>=50% of Highly Skilled 
New Graduate Jobs    >= 25% of Highly Skilled and at least 10 percentage points higher 
than older group (and none of the above) 
Non Graduate Jobs     
<25% (and none of the above) 
 
   
                                                            
26 This distinction captures the almost totality of jobs in the Portuguese economy. According to 2006 EU LFS data, less 
than 0,5% of all jobs held by graduates are left out of these three categories. We use different thresholds relative to Elias 
and Purcell (2004) as the overall share of university graduates in Portugal continues to be much lower than in the UK.   21 
 
New graduate jobs should account for the type of new specialisms described by Elias and Purcell 
(2004) which now require a much broader set of skills than in the past. Following Lavoie, Roy et 
al.’s (2003) we also make a distinction, however, between ‘data’ occupations and other new 
graduate jobs. Rather than making use of analytical or inter-personal skills to generate new 
knowledge, data jobs should mainly consist of processing large quantities of symbolic information. 
Graduates in these jobs may then be more easily substituted than complemented by new ICTs. Even 
if graduates may still be more productive than older, less qualified individuals (and therefore more 
attractive to employers), ICTs may still strengthen the degree of employers’ control in these jobs 
potentially limiting graduates’ ability to transform these jobs as to reflect their true level of skills.  
Similarly, we isolate “managerial jobs” from other graduate-level jobs. Managerial jobs in firms 
with less than ten employees, however, are unlikely to correspond to top career jobs in the same 
way as those in larger firms and they constitute a separate category in our study
27. Table 7 lists all 
the 3-digit occupations included in each category of the resulting GRADJOBS typology. Figure 9 
summarises the degree of intergenerational change in skill intensity in each one of these categories 
of jobs.  
 
Figure 9. Intergenerational Change in Skill Intensity in PT by Type of Job, 2006  
 
Source. EU LFS 2006 
Note. Skill Intensity is calculated as the share of individuals with completed university education in the total 
workforce of a particular group of jobs and in the particular age segment being analysed. Figures within brackets 
refer to the ratio between the figures for both age groups.  
 
 
The typology’s main advantage is the ability to move beyond the idea that any job with a 
(statistically) significant earnings premium is necessarily a graduate job, as assumed for example by 
Cardoso (2007). In our view, that approach limits our ability to inform an efficient public planning 
of skill provision strategies in face of future workforce skill needs. At the same time, the typology 
allows us to partly control for differences between apparent and genuine over-education with the 
latter being more likely, namely, in data and non-graduate jobs.  
                                                            
27 Also because university graduates are almost totally absent from ISCO 6-9 occupations, these were isolated into a 
residual category.  
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Table 7. Description of the GRADJOBS Typology (ISCO-88 3-digit Jobs) 
 
 
 
114 Senior officials of special-interest organisations
121 Directors and chief executives
122 Production and operations managers
123 Other specialist managers
111 Legislators and senior government officials
211 Physicists, chemists and related professionals
212 Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals
214 Architects, engineers and related professionals
221 Life science professionals
222 Health professionals (except nursing)
223 Nursing and midwifery professionals
323 Nursing and midwifery associate professionals
231 College, university and higher education teaching professionals
232 Secondary education teaching professionals
233 Primary and pre-primary education teaching professionals
235 Other teaching professionals
242 Legal professionals
244 Social science and related professionals
247 Public service administrative professionals
331 Primary education teaching associate professionals
332 Pre-primary education teaching associate professionals
311 Physical and engineering science technicians
313 Optical and electronic equipment operators
315 Safety and quality inspectors
321 Life science technicians and related associate professional
322 Health associate professionals (except nursing)
213 Computing professionals
312 Computer associate professionals
234 Special education teaching professionals
241 Business professionals
245 Writers and creative or performing artists
333 Special education teaching associate professionals
341 Finance and sales associate professionals
345 Police inspectors and detectives
243 Archivists, librarians and related information professionals
342 Business services agents and trade brokers
343 Administrative associate professionals
344 Customs, tax and related government associate professionals
411 Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks
412 Numerical clerks
413 Material-recording and transport clerks
414 Library, mail and related clerks
419 Other office clerks
421 Cashiers, tellers and related clerks
422 Client information clerks
Small Firm 
Managers 131 Managers of small enterprises
334 Other teaching associate professionals
347 Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals
511 Travel attendants and related workers
512 Housekeeping and restaurant services workers
513 Personal care and related workers
514 Other personal services workers
516 Protective services workers
521 Fashion and other models
522 Shop, stall and market salespersons and demonstrators
611-615 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
711-714 Extraction and building trades workers
721-724 Metal, machinery and related trades workers
731-734 Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers
741-744 Other craft and related trades workers
811-817 Stationary plant and related operators
821-829 Machine operators and assemblers
831-834 Drivers and mobile plant operators
911 - 916 Sales and services elementary occupations
931-933 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport
Non Graduate 
Jobs
Other Jobs 
Management 
Workers
Traditional 
Graduate Jobs
New Graduate 
Jobs
Data Jobs23 
 
Figure 10 shows separate GWPs estimates for these different job types.
28 In fact,  only graduates in 
non-graduate jobs saw the value of their degree decreasing considerably since 1995. On the 
contrary, graduates in managerial jobs and indeed female graduates in traditional graduate jobs 
saw their relative premiums increasing significantly. In other words, conditional on getting a 
graduate-level job (including new graduate jobs), the actual value of a university degree did not 
decrease substantially during this period. At the same time, there are clear differences in the level of 
GWPs across jobs and graduates in both data and non-graduate jobs were able to extract much 
lower relative gains from HE.  
 
Figure 10. Young Graduates Wage Premiums by Type of Job, 1995-2005 
a) Men        b) Women 
  
Source.  QP Dataset (1995-2005) 
Notes. See Appendix A and equation (A.4). The university education dummy is split into five further dummies depending on the 
type of job obtained by each individual. Only individuals aged between 26 and 36 were considered  
 
 
The obvious question is why, therefore, are those in higher-level jobs apparently sheltered from the 
effect of HE expansion? The apparent stability or even rise of GWPs within jobs and the sharp 
differences between them is, in our view, compatible with elements of assignment (Sattinger 1993) 
and job queue theories (Thurow 1976) and the idea that graduates’ productivity is fundamentally 
shaped at work by building on the further learning potential of HE competences rather than on their 
direct effect
29. In this case, an insufficiently elastic demand structure could explain the decrease in 
the value of HE particularly in the case of those that end up at the bottom of such job queues. 
Experienced individuals in jobs which provide significant opportunities for further skill 
development may not be easily substituted by ‘cheaper’ workers without significant investment on 
the part of employers. Besides, the non-linear effect of technological transformation on skills 
                                                            
28 Again we split the original university dummy in the original OLS regression into different dummies for each of these 
job types. Similarly experienced high-school workers act again as the reference category. 
29 In any case, supply-side determinants can still be significantly correlated with earnings or job quality measures. It is 
the assignment of graduates to particular types of jobs that works as their main determinant rather than the direct effect 
of such supply-side characteristics. Sattinger’s (1993) calls the later argument a ‘fallacy of composition’.  
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demand could be behind a growing job polarisation (Autor, Katz et al. 2006) also among graduates. 
New technologies may indeed increase the productivity of ‘true’ knowledge workers and 
complement their already high-levels of specialised skills at work. Similarly, however, they may 
help the substitution of relatively-skilled positions by jobs which employers control to a greater 
extent (Brown and Lauder 2006). This is not incompatible with rising skill intensity or indeed the 
actual restructuring of most jobs’ skill requirements. Also graduates may be preferred to less 
qualified individuals in all types of jobs simply because they can be more flexible and  still 
relatively cheap (Brown and Lauder 2006) or because they may have better ‘generic’ skills 
(communication, sociability, self-management or basic computing skills). We argue nevertheless 
that lower quality jobs still provide a significant cap to graduates’ relative earnings particularly as 
graduates may be more easily substituted. Those who Brown and Lauder (2006) call ‘knowledge 
workers without power’
30 should then be particularly exposed to the effects of the increasing supply 
of HE qualifications.   
 
7. Employment Composition Effects 
The fact that GWPs have remained fairly stable in most job indicates, therefore, that, most of them 
may have been transformed to a sufficient extent as to keep graduates’ relative position unchanged 
within job groups. In fact, non-graduate jobs constitute the only exception to this trend yet they still 
accounted for a very small percentage of graduates’ employment in 2005  – 4% in the QP dataset. 
At the same time, the stable differences in GWPs across jobs raise the possibility that graduates’ 
falling average wage premium may simply be explained by the compositional effects associated 
with their increasing prevalence particularly in data jobs. In fact, while in 1995 close to 56% of 
young university graduates were employed in either managerial or traditional graduate jobs, the 
respective figure for 2005 was only 41%. New graduate jobs and data jobs, in turn, already 
accounted  for, respectively, 27% and 25% of all young graduate jobs (with their joint share in 1995 
being 41%)
31.  
In order to assess the relative importance of compositional effects we decompose each year’s total 
graduates’ wage gap (GWGAP) into a composition and a returns effect (Oaxaca 1973; Cotton 1988; 
Neumark 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994). GWGAP is here defined as the absolute difference 
between the log hourly earnings of university and high-school graduates. These, in turn, can be 
separately expressed as:  
                                                      n                                          
(7.1)  ln |W(Xuni)|  =  αuni + ∑  βuni j Xuni j + εuni , 
                                                    j=0   
                                                   n                                          
(7.2) ln |W(Xhs)|  =  αhs + ∑  βhs j Xhs j + εhs , 
                                               j=0 
 
, where Χ is the vector of observable determinants of earnings, namely tenure, additional experience, 
employment status, sector, job type defined according to the GRADJOBS typology, work place, 
ownership, structure of firm and firm size. Assuming that b* is the vector of non-discriminating 
coefficients, calculations were made as follows:  
                 ____                ____               __        __          __       ^                   __            ^ 
(7.3) ln |W(X uni)| -ln |W (Xhs)|  =  b* (Χuni – Χhs)  +  Χuni (buni – b*) +  Χhs (b* - bhs)                      
 
                                                            
30 These authors argue, in addition, that this type of positions can be increasingly off-shored, further undermining, 
therefore, the relative position of such graduate segments.   
31 Since the QP dataset does not include the public administration sector – traditionally an important graduate employer 
– this figure does under-estimate the share of graduates in those jobs traditionally considered as graduate jobs. In fact, 
according to separate calculations based on the EU LFS dataset, 58% of young HE graduates in Portugal were still 
employed in either managerial or traditional graduate jobs in 2006.  25 
 
,where a bar above W or X refers to sample means and b to the vector of estimated coefficients for 
the various determinants of earnings. We use the reference (non-discriminating) wage structure 
proposed by Neumark (1988) who estimates the relevant set of coefficients using a pooled sample 
of both groups
32.  
The returns effect – accounted by the last two terms on the right of the above equation – can then be 
seen as graduates’ total relative premium within apparently similar jobs. As explained above, jobs 
are here defined much more specifically than previously. This then gives the total difference in 
premiums assuming a fixed level of these earnings’ determinants. Composition effects, in turn,  can 
be used to understand whether graduates’ relative earnings trends simply reflect the changing 
composition of graduates’ employment according to the characteristics we use to define jobs. It is 
associated with the difference in the determinants’ means for the two educational groups (university 
and high-school graduates) at fixed returns. 
Figure 11 first depicts the GWGAP trend for the period covered in this paper. Because, as we have 
argued, experience effects may actually serve to increase graduates’ total earnings premiums it is 
useful to consider this alternative measure which does not control for such effects. It allows us, 
therefore, to have an idea of the total premium attributed to graduates rather than focusing on the 
effect of education per se. The downward trend of graduates’ relative earnings is indeed clearly 
more pronounced if we consider this alternative measure.  
 
Figure 11. Log Hourly Earnings Gap between Young University and High-School Graduates 
(GWGAP), 1995 - 2005  
 
Source. QP 1995 – 2005 
Notes. This measure refers to the absolute difference between the mean log hourly earnings of university graduates 
aged 26-36 and the respective measure for similarly aged individuals with completed secondary education.  
 
Table 8 then shows the results of this decomposition exercise for three specific years (1995, 2000 
and 2005). Clearly the different occupational distribution of university and secondary education 
graduates stands as the most important factor conditioning both each year’s total gap as well as the 
decrease in graduates’ relative earnings across this period. The different distribution of university 
                                                            
32 Alternatively, either the university graduates’ or the high-school graduates’ wage structures could have been taken as 
the reference (non-discriminating) wage structure.  
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and high-school graduates along the GRADJOBS typology could in fact explain still more than 
55% of the total earnings gap in 2005. Less important but still relevant compositional differences 
are found regarding the combined effects of experience and tenure which contribute negatively to 
the earnings gap - as expected – and factors such as firm size and sector which contribute positively 
to the gap. The magnitudes of these contributions are nevertheless much smaller when compared 
with the effect of occupational effects.   
 
Table 8. Decomposition of GWGAP among Young University Graduates 1995, 2000, 2005 
(Oaxaca/Neumark Method) 
 
a) Men 
 
b) Women  
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. Following Neumark (1998), I take the pooled sample of university and high-school graduates as the ‘non-discriminatory’ 
earnings structure. Calculations consider only individuals aged between 26 and 36 years of age.  
 
Regarding the evolution over time of these effects, it is clear that as graduates occupy new types of 
jobs, total ‘composition effects’ tend to decrease and this was the main drive behind falling relative 
earnings for this period. This decrease was especially strong in the case of men again because there 
was in 1995 a considerably more unequal distribution of jobs between young university and high-
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school graduates. The massification of HE supply had the effect of, in short, making the average 
male graduate fall from a much better job than the average female graduate.  For men, in turn, total 
return effects actually contributed to an increase in the total earnings gap, which indicates that, 
despite the increase in the numbers of available highly educated workers, firms were still willing to 
attribute a greater premium to graduate education in 2005 within jobs. Also women saw their total 
‘return effects’ largely stabilising throughout this period.  
Finally, occupational differences in 2005 explained significantly more of the overall earnings gap of 
female graduates. Conversely, within apparently similar jobs, women are still paid less for their 
degrees than men with this effect actually increasing overtime. Finally, our results also show that a 
large part of the decrease in absolute compositional effects is associated with the increasing 
prevalence of graduates in data jobs. On the other hand, the increasing displacement of high-school 
graduates towards non-graduate jobs had the opposite effect, increasing the earnings gap between 
university and secondary education graduates, particularly in the case of women.  
Finally and even if clearly beyond the scope of this paper, the work organisation and HRM 
practices behind the increase in inequality within jobs and mainly managers’ relative earnings 
during this period deserve, in our view, further research attention. As an illustration of more 
developed calculations performed elsewhere (Figueiredo 2009), figure 12 shows QR estimates for 
two types of jobs - managerial and new graduate jobs – where growing inequality was more 
apparent. It is visible that, among men in particular, those at the very top of the wage distribution 
saw their relative situation improving considerably. This type of evidence is consistent therefore 
with the argument of rising inequality at the top or the fanning-out (Atkinson 2008) of earnings 
distribution and may also apply to graduates.  
 
Figure 12. Graduates Wage Premiums for Managers and New Graduate Jobs: Quantile Regressions, 
1995 and 2005 
a )   M e n          b )   W o m e n  
 
Source.  QP Dataset (1995, 2005) 
Notes. The results were obtained by calculating conditional QR estimates of a framework similar to that of figure 8 only 
individuals aged between 26 and 36 years of age are considered.  
 
8. The over-education effect 
In previous research, over-education has been usually seen as temporary and cohabiting with the 
modernisation of the Portuguese productive structure (Oliveira, Santos et al. 2000). In our view, it is 
easier to adhere to this idea when focusing on the long-run and particularly when earlier empirical 
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evidence supported the view that demand for tertiary skills was able to keep up or even outperform 
supply. We argue, however, that it loses relevance as the success story of HE expansion in Portugal 
looses momentum and in view of the increase in the relative penalty of over-education among 
young Portuguese graduates which we document below.  
Following the increasing diversity of jobs held by university graduates, the share of the over-
educated has indeed increased considerably both among university and high-school graduates 
(figure 13). In 2005, close to 40%  and 35% of male and female graduates were ‘over-educated’ 
according to the definition we use here. Following Oliveira, Santos et al. (2000) and Sloane (2004), 
we define the level of required education within a particular ISCO-88 3-digit occupation as the 
mode of the educational attainment of all workers in that occupation
33. We do not make a 
distinction between formal and genuine over-education which is a potential limitation since we may 
then under-estimate the transformation of some jobs’ skill requirements particularly if these changes 
are very recent
34. 
Figure 13. Share of ‘Over-Educated’ Young University and High-School Graduates (26-36), 1995 – 2005 
a) UNI graduates             b) HS graduates 
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. ‘Over-educated’ are defined as individuals who have more years of education than the mode of their respective 
3-digit occupation, considering all individuals in the sample. However, graduates with a Licenciatura-type of degree (16 
years of education) in jobs with a mode of 14 (Bacharelato) are not considered over-educated.  Where the occupation 
had more than one mode, a relatively conservative approach was used with the highest level of education being 
considered as the most frequent level of educational attainment. For more details about this definition of over-education 
please refer to Appendix F.   
 
                                                            
33 This is one of many possible measurement methods. The authors argue, however, that the use of the mode instead of 
one other measure of central location has the advantage of being less susceptible to outliers and being therefore more 
representative of the skill intensity associated with that particular occupation. It should be pointed out that this 
specification does not correspond to the commonly applied ORU specification (Hartog 2000)  which itself constitutes 
an alternative to the Mincer (1973) specification in that it also considers demand side effects through the introduction of 
a measure of required schooling. In the ORU specification, however, it is usually still assumed that the impact of one 
additional year of required or over-education is similar for individuals across all educational levels. This is clearly not 
the case in our calculations. 
34 Changes in firms’ recruitment practices may apply only to recently employed workers with its effect being then 
spread only slowly across different generations of workers The distinction between apparent or genuine over-education 
has indeed become rather important in raising the validity of recent research on over-education (see, for example, 
Chevalier 2003). A similar and common distinction made is that of formal over-qualification and skill underutilisation 
which were shown to significantly diverge (see, for example, Green and McIntosh 2007).  
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In any case, during the period covered in our study, over-education became increasingly 
synonymous with being employed either in data or non-graduate jobs, particularly among women. 
Our calculations (figure 14) show that, in 2005,close to 64% of men and 78% of the over-educated 
women were in these types of jobs. In 1995, the respective figures were 43% and 55%. New 
graduate jobs continued therefore to absorb young graduates in increasing numbers and, by 2005, 
tertiary education had become the prevalent level of educational attainment in a number of these 
jobs
35. On the other hand, the also rising over-education among high-school graduates is compatible 
with their increasing displacement from data jobs or other intermediate-skilled jobs which are now 
being increasingly filled by degree holders.  
Figure 14. Distribution of ‘Over-Educated’ Graduates by Type of Job, 1995 - 2005  
 
 
Source. QP dataset  (1995 – 2005) 
Notes. see figure 12 
 
In order to monitor the impact of over-education on the increasing dispersion of GWPs (which 
works as another proxy for job structure effects), we again substitute the original university dummy 
in our original OLS regression framework (4.1) by a vector of dummies for graduates in adequate 
jobs, over-educated graduates and under-educated graduate
36. We measure, therefore, the relative 
wage premium of each of these categories relative to the average worker with completed secondary 
education. Figure 15 presents the results of these calculations. 
This rise in over-education per se is not necessarily a surprise or problematic from a policy point of 
view. It can  underestimate changes in jobs´ skill requirements over time due to a lag between the 
start of changes in firms’ recruitment practices and the recruitment of a sufficient number of 
individuals with the ‘correct’ level of schooling (Oliveira, Santos et al. 2000). Crucially, however, if 
over-education was simply a transitional phenomenon typical of periods of modernisation,  we 
would expect the apparently over-educated to continue to enjoy stable or even rising premiums. In 
other words, if jobs could be fully transformed as to reflect the intrinsic productivity levels of 
highly qualified individuals, the occupational redistribution of graduate jobs should not necessarily 
have any impact regarding decreasing GWPs. This does not seem to be the case, however, 
according to the results shown above. 
Figure 15 shows that, beyond any compositional effects, the decrease in GWPs within jobs has 
happened solely for the over-educated. Female young graduates in adequate jobs, for example, 
actually continued to experience increasing GWPs. The relative penalty of being over-educated has 
then appeared to increase significantly. In 1995, for example, the average over-educated graduate 
                                                            
35 This provides further validity to the GRADJOBS typology we use in the paper. 
36 Under-qualified graduates refer to those with vocational oriented degrees (and 14 schooling years overall) in jobs 
where the educational mode is 16 schooling years.  30 
 
was paid more than 60% more than an average high-school worker with a similar level of 
experience while that value was close to 50% in 2005.  
 
Figure 15. Graduates Wage Premiums by Overeducated Status , 1995-2005 
a)  Men           b)  Women 
 
Source. QP Dataset (1995-2005) 
Notes. The university education dummy is split into two further dummies depending on whether or not the graduate is 
over-educated according to the definition in figure 6.13. Only individuals aged between 26 and 36 years of age are included.  
 
Graduates in jobs with higher skill intensity levels, in turn, were paid around 70% more than that 
same reference high-school graduate worker. Again here, there is an important shift in the story of 
wage inequality among graduates since the period up to 2000 was characterised by growing GWPs 
for both over-educated and adequately educated graduates (Hartog et al. 2001). 
 
9. Conclusions: is mass higher education in Portugal such a success story after all? 
Over the last decades we have observed a continuous trend of expansion higher education 
worldwide, which was largely supported by high individual and social expectations about the labour 
market benefits associated with advanced training and higher education qualification. The 
unprecedented speed and scale of higher education’s expansion has consistently raised concerns 
about the impact that that expansion could have on the aforementioned benefits. In Europe, where 
mass higher education developed later, these concerns gained momentum in the late twentieth 
century (Schomburg and Teichler, 2006). In this paper we have analysed the impact of the 
massification of higher education In Portugal, which is a particularly interesting case. Although the 
development of mass higher education was one of the latest and most concentrated in time in 
Europe, prior studies have persistently indicated that Portugal had high labour market benefits for 
higher education graduates, both on employability and long-term returns. These benefits fuelled 
persistent high demand. Nevertheless, these recent studies have shown that underneath those high 
average benefits, there was significant and growing variability in graduates’ earnings premiums, 
suggesting that the transition to labour market was becoming increasingly differentiated. 
Using a large official dataset that covers a large majority of employees, we have analysed the 
evolution of GWP for the period 1995-2005. We observe that although there is still a large premium 
for graduates, there was a visible decline in line with the continuing massification of higher 
education. We have also found, however, that most of the decline affected graduates with earnings 
below the median and that the return for higher incomes remained largely unaffected. We have also 
found that most of the erosion referred to university degree holders (the largest group among higher 
education graduates), with a fanning-out of the distribution also below the median. Their relative 
earnings have become closer to the higher earnings of those obtaining a vocational degree. 
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Differently from other studies, we have looked at changes in the composition of employment 
structure and the way this may have affected GWPs. Using a typology of graduate jobs, we have 
found that the decline affected essentially those graduates that occupied what we consider to be 
non-graduate jobs. The results also indicate that those graduates who occupied what we consider to 
be graduate jobs have not seen an erosion of their GWPs. Thus, supply and demand forces operate 
seems to be clearly more favourable to some graduates than to others and that there are signs of a 
possible increasing stratification among higher education graduates (though the deterioration still 
affects a small share of graduates). Overall, we observe that the employment dimension seems 
extremely relevant in explaining falling GWPs particularly because stable earnings premiums 
within most graduate jobs co-existed with the significant re-composition of graduates’ employment 
with a much larger share now found, for example, in data-processing jobs. Graduates in jobs for 
which they were (formally) over-qualified, in particular, appear to have taken most of the blow.   
Despite an overall positive correlation between education and employment and education and long-
term earnings, our results highlight an increasing variability of scenarios faced by higher education 
graduates. This then complicates considerably the largely successful story of HE expansion in 
Portugal with an increasing paradox arising. On the one hand, fuelled by past perceptions but also 
by the continuing advantages of some graduate segments, Portuguese students are perhaps among 
those who still expect more from a degree. Most jobs, in addition, appear to have continued to be 
transformed to an extent as to maintain graduates’ relative position relatively intact provided 
graduates are able to access them in the first place. Furthermore, graduates increasingly substitute 
less qualified individuals in intermediate-skilled positions, fuelling therefore further interest in 
attending HE education. On the other hand, due to HE expansion being very recent in Portugal, 
there is little tolerance for the sudden shift in some graduates’ fate that we documented here. 
Differences in the overall quality of different graduate job categories have indeed remained largely 
intact or even increased effectively making graduates’ position highly dependent on the type of job 
which they are assigned to. The sole re-composition of graduates’ employment during this period 
contributed significantly therefore to worsen the situation of many who now seem to be facing 
increasing difficulties visible through lower returns to their degrees and an occupational path that 
reduces their present income and possibly their longer term prospects.  
With rates of enrolment moving beyond 50% in many European countries, part of the debate should 
then move beyond attaining a degree to the type and quality of the degrees offered by the HEIs and 
those demanded by the labour market. Further studies of the competences-mix required by the type 
of jobs that now make for the majority of graduates’ employment are clearly needed as are further 
reflections on the desired role that universities should assume when training and educating such 
future workers. This has become even more relevant since the development of mass higher 
education diminished the informational value of a university degree and many employers started to 
develop other criteria to distinguish among a widening pool of candidates. On the other hand, we 
have shown elsewhere (Figueiredo 2009) that there is a higher degree of mismatch between the 
pace of HE expansion in late-massification countries such as Portugal but namely in Spain and Italy 
and these economies’ inertia in creating high-quality, graduate-level jobs. Young graduates’ in these 
countries are more likely to end up in jobs for which they may be over-educated or in lower quality 
jobs which can be significantly at odds with their initial expectations.  
Our results then converge with recent studies in presenting a more nuanced view about the complex 
links between higher education and the labour market within a context of mass higher education and 
an increasing differentiation of graduates’ prospects. Thus, although the massification has created 
good opportunities in Portugal for many younger generations, especially in contrast with previous 
generations (to whom access to higher education was a possibility for only a small elite), the 
continuing expansion seems to be creating new inequalities among graduates that mitigates the high 
expectations many of them had regarding higher education. 
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